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Abstract
We introduce a novel class of adjustment rules for a collection of beliefs.
This is an extension of Lewis’ imaging to absorb probabilistic evidence in
generalized settings. Unlike standard tools for belief revision, our proposal
may be used when information is inconsistent with an agent’s belief base.
We show that the functionals we introduce are based on the imaginary coun-
terpart of probability kinematics for standard belief revision, and prove that,
under certain conditions, all standard postulates for belief revision are satis-
fied.
1 Introduction
The theory of belief revision, originated in the work of Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson [1], is aimed to maintain consistency of a knowledge base when
updated information is gathered to a rational agent, or You. In the present work
we will focus on the probabilistic framework, where Your knowledge base is rep-
resented by a (closed and convex) collection of probability mass functions, and
some observational process is expected to induce an adjustment in the model.1
1Here we intend an adjustment as a generalized updating. We avoid this latter term as in the
literature it is often intended as equivalent to conditioning.
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With probabilities, evidence on some variables is called inconsistent when it con-
tradicts certainty (or impossibility) in Your knowledge base. We provide an ex-
ample to motivate our contribution.
Example 1. While swimming in a lake, Celeste sees some black birds from the
distance. She knows black birds living around that lake are rather tame, while
swans might be very aggressive. She is also sure that only white or grey swans
exist, although the birds she sees actually look like swans. While reasoning about
that, a sailor informs her that a small group of black swans has been spotted
around the area. Should Celeste be worried about the birds she sees?
Classic belief revision operators, introduced in Section 2, fail to absorb in-
formation from an observational process when inconsistencies arise such as in
Example 1. This feature was motivated in the literature by a partiality principle
[5], discussed below. Still, a rule for the adjustment of a model to any piece of
evidence ought to be required by a rational agent, to avoid building a new model
from scratch when unexpected information shows up. Such an operator ought
to update the knowledge base to be consistent with new evidence, while leaving
previous beliefs on related events as unchanged as possible. We will characterize
optimality requirements for such adjustment operators as an imaginary kinemat-
ics in Section 3, and extend them to deal with generalized forms of evidence.
Particularly, we consider probabilistic evidence, and extend it to i) conditional as-
sessments, and ii) imprecise assessments, that may be intended as originating from
a qualitative judgment. Section 4 will introduce adjustment functionals based on
Lewis’ imaging, and study their features and properties. We will refer throughout
to partial operators as revision rules, as opposed to general adjustment ones.
2 Background
Let Ω be any space of atoms - atomic (Boolean) propositional variables - and let a
world ω be any assignment of truth to each element from Ω, such that there exist
up to 2|Ω| conceivable worlds.
Any propositional formula φ ∈ L, countable set of all formulae on Ω, is satisfied
by worlds in [φ] ⊆ Ω. Formally, when ω satisfies φ we write ω |= φ; that is,
ω ∈ [φ] if and only if ω |= φ. Logical connectives {∧,∨,¬} - conjunction, dis-
junction and negation, respectively - may be used to concatenate several formulae.
Also, ⊤ and ⊥ denote, respectively, tautology and contradiction.
A rational agent (or You) is equipped with a collection of belief states over some
A ⊆ Ω, whose elements may be equivalently defined by closed sets of formulas
in a propositional logic language. Formally, a belief state over the set of all con-
ceivable worlds A ⊆ Ω, is represented by a probability mass function (PMF) PA,
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defined as follows:
PA(A) =
{
(ω, P (ω)) :
P (ω) ≥ 0, ω ∈ A,∑
ω∈A P (ω) = 1
}
.
Granular belief PΩ is similarly defined with respect to every ω ∈ Ω. We just write
P , when the domain is clear from the context.
Let X be a collection of n discrete variables, n ≥ 1, ω corresponds to x, con-
figuration of X in its joint possibility space, and Ω ≡ ΩX, while L reduces to a
collection of statements {φ ⊲⊳ c : φ ∈ L, ⊲⊳∈ {=,≥,≤}, c ∈ [0, 1]}. Also, A
represents any arbitrary tautology, such that any PA is strictly positive on A (and
contains zero elements only otherwise). For a given formula φ,
P (φ) =
∑
x∈Ω:x∼A
P (X = x)Ix|=φ ,
with ∼ denoting consistency among events. E.g., let n = 3, φ = {x ∧ ¬y},
(x,¬y, z) ∼ [φ], whatever z in ΩZ , coarse partition of Ω induced by variable Z.
For the sake of brevity, in the following, we write P (x), rather than P (X = x).
In the general case, a collection of deductively closed set of propositions, i.e., be-
lief states, may be used to specify a credal set (CS) K(X). Any CS K is defined
by a set of linear constraints, and may be equivalently characterized as the convex-
ification of its extreme points, denoted as ext[K]. Let K1 and K2 be any two CSs
overX, they are equivalent,K1 ≡ K2, if and only if ext[K1] = ext[K2]. For each
x ∈ ΩX , P (x) = minP (x)∈ext[K(X)] P (x) (and P (x) = maxP (x)∈ext[K(X)] P (x))
corresponds to the lower (and upper) envelope of CS K(X), for any X ∈ X. See
[25] for details on CSs. We refer to sharp or imprecise probabilities to distinguish
between |ext[K]| = 1 and |ext[K]| > 1, respectively.
KΦ denotes the subset of belief states inK that satisfy a collection of formulae Φ.
Any belief state satisfiesΦ, i.e., P |= Φ, whenever it holdsP |= φ, for each φ ∈ Φ.
Any set Φ is accepted whenever it is consistent with each P ∈ K, it is rejected
if its negation only, ¬Φ, is, or it is neutral if both are consistent. Let c ∈ [0, 1],
for a given formula φ, P |= (φ ⊲⊳ x) whenever P (φ)
(
=
∑
x∼[φ] PA(x)
)
⊲⊳ c,
⊲⊳∈ {=,≤,≥}.
For a given belief set, three main operations are relevant to adjust it to satisfy any
given φ. These are contraction, expansion and revision from AGM theory [1],
whose consistency postulates are mostly known from the KM reformulation in
[15]. Suppose an agent’s knowledge base is represented by a CS K over X, and
let φ be any upcoming formula, such that adjustment of K by φ is operated by ◦.
Katzuno and Mendelzon’s postulates translate as follows:
KM1 (K ◦ φ) |= φ,
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KM2 LetK |= φ, (K ◦ φ) ≡ (K ∪ φ),
KM3 If φ 6=⊥, then (K ◦ φ) 6=⊥,
KM4 IfK1 ≡ K2 and φ1 ≡ φ2, then (K1 ◦ φ1) ≡ (K2 ◦ φ2),
KM5 If (K ◦ φ) |= ψ, then (K ◦ (φ ∧ ψ)), for any further formula ψ,
KM6 If (K ◦ φ) |= ψ, then (K ◦ (φ ∧ ψ)) implies ((K ◦ φ) |= ψ).
Any operator ◦ that satisfies all KM postulates is equivalent to a revision process
based on total pre-orders [15].
AGM postulates, and their KM formulation, have been followed by a massive
literature on their limitations and possible extensions. Two major shortcomings
of AGM theory arise when revision involves conditional formulae [9], and in the
iterated setting [12]. See also [7] on additional postulates for iterated belief revi-
sion.
In the classical probabilistic framework, K(X) is made by a single PMF, that
is ext[K(X)] = {P (X)}. When one or more elements fromX are observed, P is
adjusted, i.e., updated, accordingly by standard conditioning. Let α be any event
from Σ, the σ-algebra induced by Ω, and suppose (X = x) with x ∈ ΩX and
X ∈ X, is observed and such that P (x) > 0, it holds:
P (α|x) = P (α, x)/P (x) . (1)
A (marginal) probabilistic observation corresponds to a PMF over the count-
able possibility space of variable X ∈ X. Such evidence bears an impression of
the degree of reliability that is associated to each (forecasted) event, i.e., on the
evidence of uncertainty [20]. We define probabilistic evidence as some PMF P ′X
over ΩX , such that P (x) 6= P
′
X(x) for some x ∈ ΩX . It corresponds to the col-
lection of formulae ΦX , whose generic element is φx = ({x} = cx), cx ∈ [0, 1],
x ∈ ΩX , with
∑
x∈ΩX
cx = 1. P
′
X may be intended as a set of probabilistic
constraints on the system modeled by P [6]. A general adjustment operator is
the functional ◦, mapping any P to P ◦, such that P ◦ |= P ′X . By the partiality
principle mentioned above, standard revision of P by P ′X requires preservation of
zero-probability events. Rationality of partiality has been advocated by several
authors (e.g., [8]). The intuition is the following: Your beliefs ought to be cali-
brated with available evidence, if any. This way, certainty on the occurrence of
event (X = x′) requires P (x) = 0, for each x 6= x′ in ΩX . If You accepted to
change Your mind on (X = x), then You would rather be reasonably sure about
its non-occurrence, rather than certain; but then P (x) 6= 0. As a consequence, cer-
tainty on the occurrence of an event, say x, implies certainty to P ′X , since P
′
X(x
′)
is floored to zero by every x′ 6= x in ΩX .
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Kinematical mechanics for the adjustment of a belief set are intended as con-
sistency principles, that we are willing to choose over a purely minimal distance
based approach [3]. We introduce probability kinematics following Wagner’s
characterization [24].
Definition 1 (Probability kinematics [14, 24]). Let P and P ◦ be any two PMFs
over (Ω,Σ), and let ΩX be a countable collection of pairwise disjoint events
in Σ, i.e., a coarse partition of Ω(≡ ΩX). P
◦ comes from P on ΩX based on
probability kinematics (PK) if there exists a sequence P ′X(X) = {P
′
X(x) : x ∈
ΩX ,
∑
x∈ΩX
P ′X(x) = 1} such that it holds:
PK1 P ◦(α|x) = P (α|x), for each x ∈ ΩX ,
PK2 P ◦(X) = P ′X(X),
for any event α ∈ Σ.
In words, P is changed to agree with P ′X (PK2), while preserving relevance of
each x ∈ ΩX to any event α ∈ Σ (PK1).
An equivalent characterization of PK yields the well-known Jeffrey’s rule:
Definition 2 (Jeffrey’s Rule [14]). Let P , P ◦ and P ′X as above. Jeffrey’s rule (◦J )
adjusts P to satisfy P ′X:
(P ◦J P
′
X) (α) =
∑
x∈ΩX
P (α, x)
P ′X(x)
P (x)
We denote the Jeffrey’s revision of P on ΩX as P
◦J
X .
Deterministic knowledge on event (X = x) may be specified by P ′X(X) such
that P ′X(x) = 1 at x and zero otherwise.
2 It holds:
(P ◦J P
′
X) (α) ≡ P (α|x) , (2)
where the righ hand-side is just conditioning from Eq. (1). Such hard evidence
[23] trivially corresponds to φ = {x}, x ∈ ΩX .
Suppose evidence is gathered conditional on some variable Y taking value
y ∈ ΩY . We define conditional (probabilistic) evidence as the collection of prob-
abilistic statements P ′X|y(X|y), such that P
′
X|y(x|y) ≥ 0, for each x ∈ ΩX , and
2While probabilistic findings extend standard evidence, they do not necessarily result from an
observation process. E.g., they may be gathered as forecasts produced by external sourced whose
system of knowledge is not disclosed (e.g., betting odds), or qualitative evaluations from experts.
Thorough characterization of uncertain evidence has been provided in the survey of [19], and
related works. There, probabilistic evidence is further distinguished into fixed and not-fixed. Such
distinction is critical to iterated belief revision.
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∑
x∈ΩX
P ′X|y(x|y) = 1, provided P (y) > 0. Equivalently, ΦX|y, with generic el-
ement φx|y = ({y → x} = cx), with
∑
x∈ΩX
cx = 1. A kinematical revision rule
would require the following conditions to hold:
Definition 3 (Conditional PK [4]). Let P and P ◦ be any two PMFs on (Ω,Σ). Let
P (y) > 0, P ◦ comes from P on ΩX × {Y = y} based on conditional probability
kinematics (CPK) if there exists a sequence P ′X|y(X|y) as above such that it holds:
CPK1 P ◦(α|x, y) = P (α|x, y), for each x ∈ ΩX ,
CPK2 P ◦(α|y′) = P (α|y′), for each y′ ∈ ΩY \{y},
CPK3 P ◦(Y ) = P (Y ),
CPK4 P ◦(X|y) = P ′X|y(X|y).
The following operator may be used to revise P , extending Jeffrey’s rule to
the conditional setting:
Definition 4 (Adams’ Conditioning [4, 9]). Let P , P ◦ and P ′X|y as above, with
P (y) > 0. Operator ◦A yields the Adams’ revision (P
◦A
X|y) of P that is consistent
with P ′X|y if it is obtained as:(
P ◦A P
′
X|y
)
(α) =
P (α,¬y) +
∑
x∈ΩX
P (α, x, y)
P ′X|y(x|y)
P (x|y)
.
By [4, Th.5], Adams’ conditioning yields the unique PMF that satisfies CPK1-
CPK4. Let us consider that in the running example.
Example 2 (Ex. 1 continued). Celeste’s beliefs are formalized as follows: let
ΩY = {y ≡ Swan,¬y ≡ ¬Swan}, ΩX = {xW ≡ White, xG ≡ Grey, xB ≡
Black} and ΩZ = {z ≡ Aggressive,¬z ≡ Tame}.
It holds:
P (Y ) = {(y, 0.7), (¬y, 0.3)} ,
P (X|Y ) =


(xW |y, 0.8), (xG|y, 0.2),
(xB|y, 0), (xW |¬y, 0.5),
(xG|¬y, 0.3), (xB|¬y, 0.2)

 ,
P (Z|Y ) =
{
(z|y, 0.95), (¬z|y, 0.05),
(z|¬y, 0.2), (¬z|¬y, 0.8)
}
.
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According to Celeste’s beliefs, P (z|xB) = 0.2. Based on the sailor’s words, Ce-
leste is willing to adjust her beliefs to be consistent withP ′X|y(X|y) = {(xW , 0.8), (xG, 0.1), (xB, 0.1)}.
Straightforward application of Adams’ conditioning is undefined, sinceP (xB|y) =
0, while P ′X|y(xB|y) 6= 0. The same would occur with simple Jeffrey’s rule, if any
P ′X(x) 6= 0 was provided, given P (x) = 0, for some x ∈ ΩX . How could Celeste
incorporate such reliable knowledge in her beliefs?
Imaging was introduced by [16] as a non-trivial alternative to conditioning on
inconsistent events. Roughly, it represents the “thought experiment by a minimal
action” [10] that makes a formula consistent.
Going back to the propositional language, if some world ω is inconsistent with
formula φ, according to a knowledge base, imaging shifts beliefs towards those
that are closest to φ, called φ-worlds. γ(ω, φ) is called a closest world function,
mapping ω to its closest φ-world; see [17] for a detailed discussion. In our for-
malism, (φ = {x}) requires γ(x, φ) = (x\{X}, x) ∈ Ω, for any x ∈ Ω.
Definition 5 (Imaging [16]). Let P be any PMF over (Ω,Σ). For a given φ and
closest world function γ(·, φ). P ◦Iφ is the image of P on φ if it is obtained by ◦I
as:
(P ◦I {φ}) (α) =
∑
ω′∈α
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω)Iγ(ω,φ)=ω′ .
In Lewis’ words, by imaging on event φ, “probability is moved around, but not
created or destroyed”, while “every share stays as close to it as it can to the world
it was originally created” [16, p. 310-311]. To summarize: i) inconsistent evi-
dence is accounted for in the image of P , whereas conditioning is left undefined;
ii) imaging changes the whole belief set to comply with reliable knowledge φ,
while conditioning redefines the domain of P , focusing on worlds in Ω consistent
with φ.
Example 3. LetX = {X, Y }, with P (x, y) = P (x,¬y) = 0, P (¬x, y) = 0.6 and
P (¬x,¬y) = 0.4. Given (φ = {x}), imaging on it yields (P ◦I {X = x}) (y) =
0.6, which corresponds to P (y). If conditioning was applied, P (Y |x) would not
be defined.
Consider α = {x}, (P ◦I {X = x}) (x) = 1: ◦I adjustsP to always be consistent
with φ = {x}.
Generalized forms of imaging were introduced in the literature, see, e.g., [11,
22]. See also [27] on a unifying approach to belief adjustment.
Gu¨nther [13] introduced Jeffrey’s imaging, that we denote as ◦jI , for the gener-
alized case of probabilistic formula (φ = c), with c ∈ [0, 1].3 Adjustment operator
◦jI trivially extends partial imaging [21].
3Gu¨nther’s definition assumes c ∈ (0, 1).
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Definition 6 (Jeffrey’s Imaging [13, 21]). Let P be any PMF over (Ω,Σ). For a
given formula {φ = c}, with c ∈ [0, 1], P
◦jI
X comes from P by Jeffrey’s imaging
◦jI on {φ = c} if it holds:
(P ◦jI {φ = c}) (α) = P
◦I
φ (α)c+ P
◦I
¬φ(α)(1− c)
We denote the Jeffrey’s image of P on {φ = c} as P
◦jI
φ .
Both standard and Jeffrey’s imaging are homomorphic change functions (see
[11] and [21, Obs.1], respectively), i.e., they define a structure-preserving map. A
generalized characterization of Jeffrey’s imaging will be provided below, within
the multi-valued imprecise-probabilistic framework (see Definition 9).
Just like Your beliefs may be encoded by a CSK on Ω, probabilistic evidence
may come as a (closed and convex) collection of PMFsK ′X on ΩX , i.e., a CS that
we call credal (or imprecise) evidence. This latter generalizes sharp probabilistic
evidence to the case |ext[K ′X(X)]| ≥ 1:
K ′X(X) = {P (x) : P (x) ≤ P (x) ≤ P (x), x ∈ ΩX} .
K ′X may be equivalently specified by the collection of formulae φx = ({x} ⊲⊳
cx), cx ∈ [0, 1], for each x ∈ ΩX , provided
∑
x∈ΩX
cx ⊲⊳ 1, ⊲⊳∈ {=,≤,≥}.
4
Our contributions will tackle probabilistic belief adjustment by (possibly in-
consistent) sharp or imprecise probabilities, following an approach based on the
imaginary counterparts of PK. This is analogous to what has been done in [18, 26]
within the framework of evidence theory.
Following [26], we are willing to check a further consistency requirement,
that would reproduce Eq. (2). In this way, any adjustment kinematical operator
reduces to some form of conditioning when probabilistic evidence strengthens to
full observation.
3 Imaginary Kinematics
We lay bare the kinematical conditions that ought to be satisfied by any belief
adjustment operator, when (possibly) inconsistent probabilistic evidence is gath-
ered.5
Let us start with simple probabilistic evidence: P ′X onΩX , such that |ΩX | ≥ 2.
Imaginary kinematics can be introduced as a counterpart of PK for imaging.
4To guarantee P ′
X
(x) ∈ [0, 1], we also require P ′
X
(x) ≤ 0 and P ′
X
(x) ≥ 1 always reduce to
equalities.
5With imprecise probabilities, inconsistency occurs when P (x) = 0 and positive evidence is
provided for some x ∈ ΩX .
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Definition 7 (Imaginary Kinematics). Any joint CS K◦ on X comes from K by
imaginary kinematics (IK) on a (possibly inconsistent) credal evidence K ′X on
variableX whenever it holds:
IK1 K◦(α|x) ⊇ K◦Ix (α), for any α ∈ Σ and each x ∈ ΩX ,
IK2 K◦(X) |= ΦX ,
IK3 K◦(X) ≡ K◦Ix (X) whenever cx = 1 for some x ∈ ΩX .
Analogously, based on Definition 3, we provide an imaginary characterization
of CPK defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Imaginary Conditional Kinematics). Let K,K◦ as above, such that
P (y) > 0 for each y ∈ ΩY . K
◦ comes from K on ΩX × {Y = y} based on
imaginary conditional kinematics (ICK) if there exists a (possibly inconsistent)
sequence P ′X|y such that it holds:
ICK1 K◦(α|x, y) ⊇ K◦Ix (α|y), for each x ∈ ΩX ,
ICK2 K◦(α|y′) ≡ K(α|y′), for each y′ ∈ ΩY \{y},
ICK3 K◦(Y ) ≡ K(Y ),
ICK4 K◦(x|y) |= ΦX|y,
ICK5 K◦(X|y) ≡ K◦Ix (X), whenever cx = 1, for some x ∈ ΩX .
4 Kinematical Imaginary Adjustment Rules
For any α ∈ Σ, if a CS K over X is used to represent Your beliefs, imaging on
(φ = {x}) extends to:
(K ◦I {x}) (α) = {P
◦I
x (α) = (P ◦I {x}) (α), P ∈ K} ,
so that the lower envelope ofK’s image on {x}, denoted as K◦Ix , at α, writes:
P ◦Ix (α) = min
P (x)∈K(X)
∑
x′∼α
∑
x∈ΩX
P (x)Iγ(x,x)=x′ .
By [22, Th.1],K◦Ix may be efficiently obtained by taking the convex hull (CH) of
the images on {x} of each P ∈ ext[K]. Since the image of each P ∈ ext[K] at
α = {x′} trivially corresponds to P ◦Ix (x
′) = 0,6 whenever x′ 6= x, refinement of
6By definition, P ◦I
x
(x) =
∑
x∈Ω
P (x) = 1.
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K◦Ix (X) degenerates to a single PMF such that P
′
X(x) = 1, and zero otherwise.
With a small abuse of notation, this yields the following:
K◦Ix (X) ≡
{
1 ·K(X\{X}) x ∼ x ,
0 otherwise.
Example 4. Let K be a CS over X = {X, Y } specified by probability intervals
as follows:
K


x1, y1
x1, y2
x2, y1
x2, y2
x3, y1
x3, y2


=


0
0
0.15− 0.35
0.25− 0.49
0− 0.45
0.03− 0.5


.
It is easy to see P ◦Ix1(yj) = P (yj), j = 1, 2, while P
◦I
x1
(xk) = 0, k = 2, 3.
4.1 Standard Probabilistic Evidence
We start from the case of sharp probabilistic evidence on ΩX , i.e., K
′
X(X) =
{P ′X(X)}. The following adjustment operator extends Definition 6. As we did
before for imaging, notation that is used with sharp beliefs applies to the general-
ized case of belief sets, when |ext[K]| ≥ 1.
Definition 9 ((Probabilistic) Jeffrey’s Imaging). LetK be any joint CS overX as
above. Suppose probabilistic evidence P ′X is provided over a (possibly) inconsis-
tent collection of events, i.e., P (x) = 0, whereas P ′X(x) > 0, for some x ∈ ΩX ,
X ∈ X. For any event α,K
◦jI
X is the probabilistic Jeffrey’s image ofK if it holds:
K
◦jI
X (α) = {P
◦jI
X (α) =
∑
x∈ΩX
P ◦Ix (α)P
′
X(x),
P ◦Ix ∈ K
◦I
x , x ∈ ΩX} .
That is,K
◦jI
X (α) = (K ◦jI P
′
X) (α), for any α ∈ Σ.
The following result holds (the proofs of all the theorems are in the appendix).
Theorem 1. Jeffrey’s imaging is based on IK, and IK1 is strongly satisfied, i.e.,
|= may be replaced by ≡.
Corollary 1. Given sharp probabilistic knowledge on ΩX , the Jeffrey’s image of
any CS may be equivalently specified by the convexification of all PMFs P ◦, each
defined as follows:
P ◦(α) =
∑
x∼α
P ′X(x)Pi(α) ∀P ∈ ext[K] .
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It is easy to see that standard imaging is also trivially based on IK.
Example 5. Consider the same setup as in Example 4, and suppose P ′X(X) =
{(x1, 0.3), (x2, 0), (x3, 0.7)}. By Jeffrey’s imaging on P
′
X , we obtain K
◦jI
X (Y ) ≡
K(Y ), while P
◦jI
X (yj|xi) ≡ K
◦I
xi
(yj), i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2. Also, K
◦jI
X (X) |=
P ′X(X), andK
◦jI
X is equivalent to the convex hull of PMFs P
◦, defined as:
P ◦(x, y) = P ′X(x)P (y) ,
for each x ∈ ΩX , y ∈ ΩY and P ∈ ext[K].
4.2 Sharp Conditional Evidence
We now introduce Adams’ imaging as an adjustment operator ◦aI , that extends
◦jI to the conditional case, just like revision rule ◦A extends ◦J .
Definition 10 (Adams’ Imaging). Let K be any joint CS on (Ω,Σ) such that
P (y) > 0, Y ∈ X, and let conditional probabilistic knowledge P ′X|y on ΩX ×
{Y = y}. K◦aI
X|y, the Adams’ image of K on P
′
X|y, comes from K by Adams’
imaging ◦aI , if it holds:
K◦aI
X|y(α) =
{P ◦aI
X|y(α) = P (α,¬y) +
∑
x∈ΩX
P ◦Ix (α, y)P
′
X|y(x|y),
P ∈ K,P ◦Ix ∈ K
◦I
x , x ∈ ΩX} .
I.e., K◦aI
X|y(α) =
(
K ◦aI P
′
X|y
)
(α), for any α ∈ Σ.
When |ext[K]| = 1, from previous considerations, Adams’ imaging reduces
to the following:
P ◦aI
X|y(α) = P (α,¬y) +
∑
x∈ΩX
P ◦Ix (α, y)P
′
X|y(x|y) . (3)
Example 6 (Ex. 1 continued). The Adams’ image on P ′X|y of Celeste’s beliefs on
ΩX × ΩZ is the following:
P ◦aI
X|y


xW z
xW¬z
xGz
xG¬z
xBz
xB¬z


=


0.5620
0.1480
0.0845
0.0755
0.0785
0.0515


.
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It holds P ◦aI
X|y(X|y) = P
′
X|y(X|y) and P
◦aI
X|y(Y, Z) = P (Y, Z). Adjustment
of her beliefs by P ′X|y yields P
◦aI
X|y(z|xB) ≈ 0.6, whereas P (z|xB) = 0.2. Thus,
Celeste rapidly swims back to shore.
As a remark, inconsistency of P ′X|y(x|y), for some x ∈ ΩX , with respect to
any PMF P , may refer to either i) P (x|y) = 0, while P (y) > 0, (this is just the
case of Adams’ imaging above), or ii) P (y) = 0 in the first place, and possibly
P (x|y) = 0. We argue case ii) deserves some caution, since full inconsistency
of event (Y = y) is likely not to yield any further conjecturing on related events,
from a modeler’s perspective. E.g., You are certain that no alien lives on Mars.
Is it worth include Your belief on the alien having long hair in Your belief base,
provided that You are not admitting the alien’s existence upstream? On the other
hand, we reckon arguments may be easily raised against our position, starting
from our proposed running example. Still, if no evidence is provided on ΩY , a
cautious approach would require application of an iterated procedure. We leave
this point for future work.
It is now straightforward to note that Adams’ imaging generalizes Jeffrey’s
imaging to the conditional setting.
Theorem 2. Adams’ imaging is based on ICK, and ICK1 is strongly satisfied.
Eq. (3) strongly satisfies all conditions.
Analogously to Corollary 1, it might be easily shown that K◦aI
X|y at any x ∼ y
is equivalent to the CS obtained taking the product of sharp assessment P ′X|y and
the marginalization over variable X of the original belief set K. We also provide
the following additional result, which extends [22].
Theorem 3. Both Jeffrey’s and Adams’ imaging satisfy consistency axioms KM1,
KM3 and KM4. KM2, KM5 and KM6 are satisfied only is K is degenerate at
(X|y), i.e., |K(X|y)| = 1 (and at (Z|w), for KM5 and KM6).
4.3 Credal Jeffrey’s Imaging
When beliefs are expressed as a joint CS over X, adjustment by a single reliable
PMF requires simultaneous computation of all bounds spanned by the updating
of each P ∈ K. Also in this case, adjustment may be restricted to the PMFs in
ext[K] only, and their convex hull consequently considered.
Definition 11 (Credal Jeffrey’s Imaging). Given CS K over X and credal proba-
bilistic evidenceK ′X(X), we define credal Jeffrey’s imaging ◦cjI as the functional
12
mappingK to CS K
◦cjI
X , consistent withK
′
X(X) as follows:
K
◦cjI
X (α)
=
{
P ◦(α) = (P ◦jI P
′
X) (α),
P (X) ∈ K(X),
P ′X ∈ K
′
X(X)
}
The following result generalizes Theorem 1.
Theorem 4. Given (possibly) inconsistent credal probabilistic evidence, credal
Jeffrey’s imaging yields the unique joint CS based on IK.
Table 1: Summary of belief adjustment rules/properties.
RULE Φ∗ KINEMATICS
◦J φx = cx, ∀x PK
◦A {y → x} = cx, ∀x CPK
◦jI {x} = cx, ∀x IK (Th. 1)
◦aI {y → x} = cx, ∀x ICK (Th. 2)
◦cjI {x} ⊲⊳ cx, ∀x IK (Th. 4)
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We introduced adjustment operators based on Lewis’ imaging functional, to deal
with probabilistic inconsistent evidence, in a generalized setting of imprecise
probabilities, specified by credal sets. These are summarized in Table 1. We point
out that the revision rules (conditioning, Jeffrey’s rule and Adams’ conditioning)
are not fully general due to partiality, whereas the remaining succeed in adjusting
a given belief set following inconsistent observations.
Further generalization to the case of credal conditional probabilistic evidence
is not straightforward as the adjustment process would likely incur in dilating
mechanics, resulting in detrimental loose inclusion relationships. This reasoning
also applies to the iterated framework, where additional considerations must be
formulated on the role evidence plays on the adjustment process. As a future
work we will tackle this sort of scenarios. Besides that, we also intend to compare
our approach against methods based on lexicographic probabilities (e.g., [2]) as
well as applying these ideas to probabilistic graphical models by extending what
have been already done for Jeffrey’s rule in [?].
13
A Proofs
This appendix provides proofs to the results stated in the paper.
Proof of Th. 1. To prove ◦jI is based on IK, we must check it produces a CS that
satisfies IK1-IK3. Motivated by [22, Th.1], we restrict our attention toward the
extreme points of K. Without loss of generality, let X = {X, Y }. Each extreme
point of K(X), say Pj,k ∈ ext[K], may be equivalently specified as:
Pj,k(x, y) = P (x|x
′
j)P (y|x, y
′
k) , (4)
with P (y|x, y′k) is set equal to zero whenever it is undefined and P (x|x
′
k) = 0.
7
X ′ and Y ′ are uniformly distributed auxiliary random variables, used to index
K’s extreme points atX and at Y |X , respectively. This way, for a given ordering,
P (x|x′1) =
∑
y′
k
,y
P (x|x′1)P (y|x, y
′
k)P (y
′
k)
= P (x) ,
and P (x, y) = P (x|x′1)P (y|x, y
′
1).
It holds:
P ◦Ix (x) = P
◦I
x (x|x
′
1)
=
∑
y′
k
,y,x
P (x|x′1)P (y|x, y
′
k)P (y
′
k)
≤ 1 .
Since P ◦Ix (x
′|x′1) = 0, for any x
′ 6= x in ΩX , refinement of K
◦I
x (x) degenerates at
1. If P ′X |= (φ = {x}), IK3 is satisfied.
When a non-trivial PMF is provided, i.e., P (x) > 0 for at least two elements in
ΩX , it holds:
P
◦jI
X (x|x
′
1) =

∑
y′
k
,y,x
P (x|x′1)P (y|x, y
′
k)P (y
′
k)

P ′X(x)
≤ P ′X(x) ,
and similarly P
◦jI
X (x|x
′
|ext[K]|) ≥ P
′
X(x). This proves IK2 since K
◦jI
X (X) ∋
P ′X(X).
7As a remark, P (x) = 0 does not necessarily imply P (y|x) = 0, in De Finetti’s view.
14
Proof of IK1 is also straightforward:
P
◦jI
X (y|x, y
′
1) =
[∑
x,x′j
P (x|x′j)P (y|x, y
′
1)
]
P ′X(x)
P ′X(x)
=
∑
x,x′j
P (x|x′j)P (y|x, y
′
1)
= P ◦Ix (y|y
′
1)
Analogous reasoning applies to the upper envelope, and thusK
◦jI
X (Y |x) ≡ K
◦I
x (Y ).
This ends the proof.

Proof of Th. 2. To prove ◦aI is based on ICK we need to check ICK1-ICK5 are
satisfied by K◦ =
(
K ◦aI P
′
X|y
)
. When |ext[K]| = 1, ICK1-ICK5 reduce to the
following:
ICK1’ P ◦(α|x, y) = P ◦Ix (α|y), for each x ∈ ΩX ,
ICK2’ P ◦(α|y′) = P (α|y′),
ICK3’ P ◦(Y ) = P (Y ),
ICK4’ P ◦(X|y) = P ′X|y(X|y),
ICK5’ P ◦(X|y) = P ◦Ix (X|y), whenever P
′
X|y(x|y) = 1 for some x ∈ ΩX .
We first prove consistency points ICK4’ and ICK5’. Let P ′X|y be any PMF on
ΩX × {Y = y}, it holds:
P ◦aI
X|y(x|y) =
P ◦Ix (y)P
′
X|y(x|y)∑
x P
◦I
x (y)P ′X|y(x|y)
= P ′X|y(x|y)
since P ◦Ix (x, y) = P
◦I
x (y) = P (y), whatever x ∈ ΩX . Also,
∑
x P
′
X|y(x|y) = 1
by definition. If P ′X|y(x|y) = 1 for some x, P
◦aI
X|y(x|y) = 1, 0 otherwise. The
following holds:
P ◦(x|y) = min
P ◦∈ext[K◦]
P ◦(x|y)
= P ′X|y(x|y)
P
◦I
x (y)
P ◦Ix (y)
≤ P ′X|y(x|y) .
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Similarly, P
◦
(X|y) ≥ P ′X|y(X|y), for each P
◦ ∈ ext[K◦].
We now prove condition ICK1 (and thus ICK1’) is satisfied by ◦aI . Without loss of
generality, let X = {X, Y, Z}. It holds:
P ◦(z|x, y) =
P ′X|y(x|y)P
◦I
x (z, y)
P ′
X|y(x|y)P
◦I
x (y)
= P ◦Ix (z|y) .
As for point ICK2 (and ICK2’), it trivially holds by Definition 10:
P ◦(z|y′) = P (z|y′) .
for any y′ 6= y. ICK3’ is proved analogously, since P ◦aI
X|y(y) = 1 − P (¬y) =
1−
∑
y′ 6=y P
◦aI
X|y(y
′). Similarly, fulfillment of ICK3 may be derived by the conjugacy
relation [25].

Proof of Th. 3. Consider CSK and conditional probabilistic evidenceP ′X|y(X|y).
To avoid cumbersome notation, we write ◦ to denote ◦aI throughout the proof.
Also, we refer to general formula φ = c to denote both φx and φx|y.
KM1 and KM3 follow from IK2 and ICK4 (cfr Th.1 and Th.2, respectively).
We prove KM2 is not satisfied under general conditions. Consider the lower en-
velope of K at (x|y). If K |= P ′X|y, it holds:
P (x|y) ≤ P ′X|y(x|y)
by definition, and
(
K ∪ P ′X|y
)
= K. From previous discussion, we expect (K ◦
P ′X|y) ⊇ K, equality holding if and only if K(X) may be equivalently specified
as the product of sharp conditional assessment on ΩX × {Y = y} and CS over
(X\{Y }, y). Same reasoning applies to KM5 and KM6. These three postulates
are satisfied if and only if K is already degenerate at the domain of probabilistic
evidence, and consistent with it already.
Postulate KM4 holds by [22, Th.1].

The following preliminary result holds:
Lemma 1. Let K be a joint CS over X, and let K ′X denote a credal probabilistic
finding, gathered on ΩX . For any event α, the Jeffrey’s image K
◦cjI
X (α) of K(α)
on K ′X(X) satisfies the following:
K
◦cjI
X (α) ⊇ K
◦cjI
X (α|x) ⊇ K
◦I
x (α)
for any α ∈ Σ. Equality holds when |K ′(X)| = 1.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Let X = {X, Y } and K be any CS over Ω. K ′X is gathered
on ΩX , to adjustK accordingly. By definition of credal Jeffrey’s imaging, it holds:
min
P
◦cjI
X
∈K
◦jI
X
P
◦cjI
X (y|x) = min
P (y)∈K(Y )
P (y)
P ′X(x)
P
′
X(x)
≤ min
P (y)∈K(Y )
P (y) ,
and analogously for the upper envelope, with≥. This proves the rightest inclusion
relationship: K
◦cjI
X (Y |x) ⊇ K
◦I
x (Y )(≡ K(Y )).
We now prove inclusion ofK
◦cjI
X (y|x) byK
◦cjI
X (y):
P
◦cjI
X (y)
P
◦cjI
X (y|x)
=
P (y)
∑
x P
′
X(x)
P (y)
P ′X(x)
P
′
X(x)
= P
′
X(x)
∑
x′ 6=x
P ′X(x
′)
≤ 1 .
Hence P
◦cjI
X (y) ≤ P
◦cjI
X (y|x), for any x ∈ ΩX , y ∈ ΩY . P
◦cjI
X (y) ≥ P
◦cjI
X (y|x) is
derived analogously.
Equality holds whenK ′X(X) = {P
′
X(X)} as P
′
X(x) = P
′
X(x), for each x ∈ ΩX ,
summing to one.

Proof of Th. 4. Given a joint CS K over X andK ′X , let ◦ denote credal Jeffrey’s
imaging.
IK1 is satisfied by Lemma 1. IK2 is also satisfied as it holds:
P
◦cjI
X (x) = 1 · P
′
X(x) ,
for each x ∈ ΩX . And analogously for P
◦cjI
X (X). When K
′
X(X) = {P
′
X(X)}
such that P ′X(x) = 1, IK3 is satisfied since ◦cjI reduces to ◦jI .

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